Facts: Petitioner Herald Dacasin,
American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Filipino were married in
Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, who was born on
September 21, 1995.
On June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Circuit
Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois. The Illinois court
dissolved the marriage of the two and awarded the respondent sole custody of
Stephanie. It also retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
purposes.
On January 28, 2002, both the petitioner and respondent executed a contract for
joint custody over Stephanie in Manila. Later, on 2004, Herald filed a case
against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over Stephanie
contrary to their agreement. Sharon sought the dismissal of the complaint for,
among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
On March 1, 2005, the trial court sustained the respondent's motion and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it
is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois
court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its
order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce
decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in
this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction.
Petitioner sought reconsideration,
raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is
void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration,
holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner under the laws of his nationality. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's suit and enforce the Agreement
on the joint custody of the parties' child.
Held: Yes. Subject matter jurisdiction is
conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for
specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on
joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions.
Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner
went to the right court. Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain
petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its
thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of
jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court
retained was “jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry
the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.” Petitioner’s
suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce
decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus,
the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called “retained
jurisdiction.”
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