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Monday, October 21, 2013

P/Chief Inspector Fernando Billedo, et al vs. Wilhemina Wagan, et al, G.R. No. 175091, July 13, 2011

Rule 111


Facts:
           On February 27, 2000, Alberto Mina, Nilo Jay Mina and Ferdinand Caasi were arrested by the petitioners-police officers along an alley in Pasay City. They were charged with violation of City Ordinance No. 265 (Drinking Liquor in Public Places). Those arrested, then, filed a civil case against the petitioners-police men for damages, alleging that their arrest was only by inducement and unjustifiable accusations of Ferdinand and Mariano Cruz.

           Subsequently, criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioners before the City Prosecution Office (CPO) and the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for Unlawful Arrest and Violation of R.A. No. 7438 (Act Defining Rights of Person Under Custodial Investigation). The CPO dismissed the case for lack of merit while the Ombudsman, in its Joint Resolution dated October 13, 2000,[5] dismissed both complaints for lack of probable cause, but recommended the filing of 3 corresponding criminal informations for Violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019.  After the criminal informations for Violation of R.A. No. 3019 were filed, the cases were remanded to the CPO for the conduct of the new preliminary investigation on motion of the accused.

            On July 27, 2001, the CPO recommended the dismissal of the cases for lack of merit. While it may be argued that the Cruzes may have been biased, there appeared to be a semblance of truth to their report when private respondents were arrested by the police officers. Besides, the subsequent filing of the corresponding information after the inquest investigation for a violation of a city ordinance, is per se an imprimatur of the legality of their arrest.   

         On August 29, 2001, the Ombudsman recommended the approval of the CPO Resolution. Meanwhile, the complainants were found guilty by the MeTC for Violation of City Ordinance No. 265.Their conviction was affirmed by the RTC, Branch 114, Pasay City. Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

          Civil Case No. 00-0089, on the other hand, proceeded with the trial with the complainants presenting their first witness. Before cross-examination, Ferdinand A. Cruz, one of the petitioners, filed his Motion to Dismiss, alleging therein that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the civil case and not the RTC; and that conformably to Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the complainants are barred from filing a separate and independent civil action.  

        The motion to dismiss was denied invoking Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of “unlawful arrest” is punishable by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos which, under R.A. No. 7691, falls within the jurisdiction of appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, contrary to the movant’s claim that it was the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the ancillary action for damages. 

           Public respondent further explained that had there been a criminal case for unlawful arrest filed before the MeTC, the civil case for damages should have been transferred to it, but, there was none. She also stated that the movant failed to attach certified copies of resolutions/orders dismissing the complaint for unlawful arrest. Thus, she could not simply rely on bare assertions or conjectures but must resolve the issues raised based on competent proof.

            Petitioner Ferdinand Cruz then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the assailed July 12, 2006 Order. Public respondent wrote that the situation was not within the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. The provision suggests of two (2) situations. 

          First, a criminal action has been instituted before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously instituted with it. Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case, is still pending upon the filing of the criminal action, in which case, the civil case should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case for consolidation and joint determination.

           Considering the circumstances surrounding the case, the public respondent opined that the case did not fall in any of the two cited situations. Aggrieved, petitioners come before this Court.  While they admit that they are aware of the principle of the hierarchy of the courts, they opted to directly appeal before this Court considering that the issue to be resolved entails an interpretation of Section 4, R.A. No. 8249, otherwise known as the “Sandiganbayan Act,”

Issue: Whether or not the regional trial court or any other courts has the jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 00-0089 given the mandatory simultaneous institution and joint determination of a civil liability with the criminal action and the express prohibition to file the said civil action separately from the criminal action as provided for under Sec. 4 of R.A. 8249.

Held: Yes.  In their Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, petitioners contend that the Regional Trial Court or any other court no has jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 00-00089 given that in cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan, there is a mandatory simultaneous institution and joint determination of the civil liability with the criminal action and the express prohibition to file the said civil action separately from the criminal action as provided under Section 4 of R.A. 8249. In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that the subject civil case (i.e., Civil Case No. 00-00089) does not fall within the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. 

           Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 contemplates only two (2) situations and these were correctly pointed out by the public respondent as follows: First, a criminal action has been instituted before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously instituted with it; and second, the civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case, is still pending when the criminal action was filed, in which case, the civil case should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case for consolidation and joint determination. Evidently, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no application in this case since no criminal action has been filed before the Sandiganbayan or any appropriate court. Thus, there is no appropriate court to which the subject civil case can be transferred or consolidated as mandated by the said provision. 

            It is also illogical to consider the civil case as abandoned simply because the criminal cases against petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage. A reading of the latter part of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civil case will only be considered abandoned if there is a pending criminal case and the civil case was not transferred to the court trying the criminal case for joint determination. The criminal charges against petitioners might have been dismissed at the preliminary stage for lack of probable cause, but it does not mean that the civil case instituted prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is already baseless as the complainants can prove their cause of action in the civil case by mere preponderance of evidence.

Cheng v. Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009

Rule 111




Facts:
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two estafa cases before the RTC of Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) checks which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account. They were supposed to be payment of their loan from the petitioner.

            On January 20, 1999, Cheng also filed two cases for violation of BP 22 alleging the same facts before the MeTC of Manila. The estafa cases were later dismissed for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. One of the criminal cases dismissed contained no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy. But, the second one contained a statement, “Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature.”

            Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court.  The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.

            Then, on April 26, 2005, Cheng lodged a complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages. The case was filed in the RTC of Manila and was based on the same PBC checks which were previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.

            But, on January 2, 2006, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was later on denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused (respondents herein)?

Held:
Yes. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure.

However, petitioner is in error when she insisted that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999.  It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation.  The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. 

 It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.  The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

          Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks.  It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action.  In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court.  The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case.  Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. 

Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases.  In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without a remedy to recover from respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her.  This could prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of time.[21]  Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.

          It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical.  Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases.  On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks.  Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner.  Her failure to appeal within the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents.  However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.

Sunday, October 20, 2013

Casupanan et al. v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, Aug. 26, 2002

Crim Pro - Rule 111



FACTS:
As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan, two cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil case.

On a Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.

Casupanan and Capitulo contend that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident.

They maintain that under Articles 31 and2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.

Laroya's argued that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleged that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Moreover, Laroya argued that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

Issue: Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file simultaneously and independently a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

Held:
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.  The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Moreover, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case.  This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in a separate civil action.”  This is only fair for two reasons. 

First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case.  The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party.  If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action.  To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.  The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.